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 The Dilemma of Planning
 in Large-Scale Public Organizations:
 The Case of the United States Navy*
 Nancy C. Roberts and Linda Wargo
 Naval Postgraduate School
 ABSTRACT
 Planning enables organizations to coordinate their activities.
 Yet planning can have dysfunctional consequences, especially as
 organizations increase in size. If the requirements of the planning
 cycle exceed an organization's ability to respond in a timely
 fashion to its external environment, then the organization is
 forced to use alternative planning approaches. We first outline
 some alternatives developed in business and then illustrate how
 similar approaches have been used in the United States Navy. We
 conclude with recommendations for planning in other large-scale
 public organizations that need to compensate for size as they
 engage in organizational planning.
 A change of scale is not simply a linear extension of size. As Galileo once
 defined it in his square cube law, a change of size is a change in form and
 consequently in institution. Most of our older discussions of rights and
 responsibilities are modeled on an organizational form whose size is of vastly
 smaller magnitude than our own. It is this change of scale, in all its dimensions
 and for all its consequences, that still has to be explored.
 -Daniel Bell
 With increasing size both the managerial function and the basic administrative
 structure have undergone fundamental changes which profoundly affect the nature
 of the 'organism' itself. The differences in the administrative structure of the
 very small and the very large firms are so great that in many ways it is hard to
 see that the two species are of the same genus. We say they are because they
 both fulfill the same function, yet they certainly fulfill it differently, and it may
 be that in time the differences will be so great that we should consider in what
 sense they can both be called industrial 'firms'.
 -Edith Penrose
 INTRODUCTION
 There are advantages to organizational size. Larger organi-
 zations are in a good position to achieve economies of scale and
 by implication greater revenues and profits. With more capital,
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 they have access to a variety of human resources and a larger
 market, hence a better chance of survival than do smaller organi-
 zations. As they increase in size, they are able to impose a cer-
 tain degree of stability on their external environment and provide
 their members with greater adventure and risk, power and job
 security. In competition with other organizations, as Clausewitz
 (1940) noted for military organizations, largeness can be used to
 counter largeness. In war, mass can be countered with mass. (See
 Starbuck 1964 for a review of the advantages of size.)
 Organizational size also has its price (Aldrich and Auster
 1986). Experiencing diminishing returns as they grow, larger
 organizations begin to lose their flexibility and innovativeness
 (Crozier 1964; Child and Kieser 1981). "Slow, ponderous,
 wedded to old habits and processes," they become "more con-
 cerned with rules, regulations, and procedures than with achieve-
 ment or objectives" (Brown 1982, 78). Basically conservative in
 nature, large organizations prefer to serve well-established goals
 than to seek new ones. Individual initiative therefore is not
 encouraged, nor is risk taking. Indeed, those serving in large
 organizations over a long period of time can develop "bureau-
 pathic behavior"-frustration, lethargy, cynicism, dependency
 (Hummell 1977).
 Large organizations also create their own moral codes which
 they impose on members, especially loyalty to the organization
 (Scott and Hart 1979). Self-serving and concerned with their own
 survival,, they can provoke behavior inimical to society's inter-
 ests. "The bigger the organization, the greater the possibility of
 its setting its own standards" (Brown 1982, 62). Large organiza-
 tions are also virtually uncontrollable according to Anthony
 Downs (1967). And the larger they become, "the weaker is the
 control over its actions exercised by those at the top" (p. 143).
 No one knows fully what is going on in them, and even if it
 could be known it could not be controlled. It is impossible to
 localize responsibility (Arendt 1969).
 Those who are concerned with the disadvantages of organi-
 zational size have been calling for public organizations' "rein-
 vention" and "re-engineering" (Osborne and Gaebler 1992;
 Hammer and Champy 1992). The goal is to make organizations
 more flexible, innovative, and accountable to their customers.
 Even if we were to assume that as a consequence of these and
 other reform activities most large-scale public organizations
 would begin to downsize, there are some organizations that are
 expected to retain their grand scale. The United States De-
 partment of the Navy, for example, would still be a large
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 organization even if it were reduced by half, a reduction in force
 that is not anticipated by even its most vocal critics. In other
 words, by virtue of their missions and functions some public or-
 ganizations are expected to remain very large entities.
 Our concern in this article is for large public sector organi-
 zations.1 We seek to understand how they can be managed in
 ways that will enable them to avoid the disadvantages associated
 with size. If, as Daniel Bell and Edith Penrose suggest, large-
 scale organizations are not linear extrapolations of smaller ones
 but represent different forms of social organization, then it stands
 to reason that principles of management and organization have to
 be modified accordingly. Principles invented for simpler and
 smaller units of social organization are not expected to meet the
 needs of large-scale systems.
 Our article builds on this premise and explores one function
 of management as it relates to size. We argue in the next section
 that the planning process developed for smaller organizations can
 be dysfunctional in larger organizations. As organizations grow
 in size, they are forced, by necessity, to seek different forms of
 planning to accommodate their larger scale. We refer to these
 alternative forms of planning as compensatory approaches and
 outline their major features as they have been practiced in
 business. Using the example of the United States Navy, we then
 illustrate how these compensatory planning approaches have been
 employed in large public sector bureaus as well. The Navy's
 recent experience in strategic issues management is offered as a
 planning approach for other large public bureaus to consider in
 the future.
 Before we begin this exercise, however, let us clarify what
 we mean by large-scale organization and what we mean by plan-
 ning. The concept of organizational size is a very muddy con-
 cept. It has been defined and measured in a number of ways
 (Caplow 1957; Kimberly 1976; Gupta 1980; Mileti, Gillespie,
 and Eitzen 1981; Scott 1992). We will observe a standard con-
 vention and consider the number of individuals employed full-
 time by the organization to be the measure of organizational size.
 (Kimberly [1976] found that over 80 percent of the studies he
 reviewed used this definition of size.) Considering size from this
 perspective, we define a small organization as one having less
 than one hundred people. A mid-size organization employs up to
 two thousand people and a large organization has up to ten
 thousand employees. Organizations that have over ten thousand
 members are what we consider to be "mega" organizations. They
 are the point of reference when we discuss large-scale organiza-
 tions.
 'A public bureau is defined as an organi-
 zation that has public funding, public
 ownership, and a polyarchic mode of
 social control (Perry and Rainey 1988;
 Roberts 1992).
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 Planning exists at all levels within the organization, but we
 will use the term organizational planning to refer to planning for
 the entity rather than its parts. It is a process by which an
 organization determines its mission, major goals, strategies, and
 policies in order to allocate its resources and pursue its aims.
 This level of planning often is referred to as corporate-level
 planning in the private sector (Hofer and Schendel 1978).
 Organizational planning is distinguished from functional
 planning or operational planning. Rather than plan for the whole
 organization, functional/operational planning provides guidance
 for specific subunits such as personnel, accounting, marketing, or
 production. Functional plans are expected to be compatible with
 organizational plans and in fact form the basis of the implemen-
 tation of those plans.
 To avoid confusion, we will not use the term long-range
 planning. The term introduces too much ambiguity into the dis-
 cussion of planning-What is long-term? and Does the term refer
 to long-range functional and operational plans or long-range
 organizational plans? Instead, we assume that organizational
 planning incorporates a future orientation, the exact time frame
 to be determined by the particular factors in the organization's
 environment and culture-it could be two years or it could be
 ten. We also will not use the term strategic planning, the pre-
 ferred descriptor used in business management. In military
 organizations, strategic planning sometimes is confounded with
 planning for nuclear war. Hoping to avoid that confusion, we use
 the term organizational planning to mean a future-oriented,
 organization-wide, integrated approach to planning that can be
 either a formal or an informal process.
 DILEMMAS OF PLANNING AND SIZE
 By most accounts, introducing and implementing an organi-
 zation's planning process requires a major investment of time and
 resources. All organizational systems contain parts that perform
 specialized tasks for the whole. Despite their differentiation,
 these interdependent parts have to be coordinated to maintain
 system identity, coherence, and productivity. At the same time,
 the organization has to respond to environmental threats and
 opportunities. Managing the part-whole relationship while adjust-
 ing and adapting to environmental changes makes the planning
 process, especially its coordination, difficult. This process is
 challenging enough when the organization is small. It becomes
 even more daunting as the organization grows.
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 We know, for example, that as organizations grow, organi-
 zational members' tasks become more differentiated. Work be-
 comes subdivided into different positions, ranks or levels, and
 subunits. The larger the organization, the greater the differen-
 tiation (Blau 1970; Blau and Schoenherr 1971). Over time, this
 differentiation creates divergent perspectives among the subunit
 members. Differences surface among subunit members in what
 they value and perceive, and ultimately in the way they think and
 act. Marked by differentiated tasks and divergent perspectives,
 organizations then are challenged to find ways to integrate the
 subunits and to coordinate their work to ensure a high level of
 overall organizational performance.
 When organizations are small they tend to rely on informal,
 face-to-face (one-on-one) communication as the mechanism of
 coordination. As organizations grow, communication becomes
 more formal since it is not possible to communicate with every-
 one. (The number of one-on-one connections increases geo-
 metrically as size increases arithmetically [Graicunas 1933].)
 More complex means of coordination-such as formalized
 rules, standardized jobs, and routinized programs-and pro-
 cedures then are devised (Child 1973; Astley 1985). When
 adopted by all subunits of the organization, they serve as
 substitutes for continual interpersonal communication. "The
 resultant aggregate," according to Galbraith (1973), "is an
 integrated or coordinated pattern of behavior" (p. 10).
 Reliance on formalized procedures serves their purpose as
 long as situations are anticipated and appropriate action can be
 specified in the rules and regulations. However, when organiza-
 tions confront new situations for which the rules no long apply,
 then alternative mechanisms of coordination have to be devised.
 At this point, organizations turn to hierarchy and its managers to
 handle the information and problem solving that uncertainty pro-
 vokes. Managers then have the responsibility of creating a
 coordinated response for lower-level subunits. While rules handle
 coordination for uniform and repetitive situations, managers
 handle coordination by exception for new and unique situations
 (Galbraith 1973).
 These mechanisms of coordination become less effective,
 however, as the organization's environment becomes more uncer-
 tain and unique situations predominate. At some point the man-
 agers in the hierarchy become overloaded in their ability to
 process information and are unable to provide direction and
 coordination. As a consequence, managers then turn to goal
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 setting and goals as an alternative mechanism of coordination
 (Galbraith 1973). Rather than specify rules and procedures or
 rely on the hierarchy to handle exceptions, plans and goals enable
 managers to manage the interdependence among subunits. Once
 they are established, targets set the parameters of action within
 which lower-level units can operate. As long as subunits perform
 within their planned targets, little communication and coordina-
 tion on work-related matters is necessary. The few exceptions
 that occur can be processed by higher-level managers.
 Managers have developed some rather elaborate planning
 methods for organizational coordination. The ideal, described as
 the comprehensive approach to planning, envisionls a conscious,
 rational decision process by which an organization formulates its
 goals and then implements and monitors them, making adjust-
 ments as environmental and organizational conditions warrant.
 Goals are established in light of the organization's resources and
 its internal strengths and weaknesses, as well as the opportunities
 and threats that exist in its external environment. Goals are
 expected to be developed consciously, mutually reinforcing and
 integrated into a comprehensive whole, so that organizational
 activity can be coordinated and controlled (Fredrickson 1983).
 Thus the ideal often is described as "integrative comprehensive-
 ness" (Fredrickson 1983).
 This type of planning process creates its own imperatives,
 however. Planning requires additional time, resources, and exper-
 tise. Managers are expected to meet frequently to make plans for
 their activities. Routines are established to specify who meets,
 when and where, and who will assist in the process. Formalized
 positions also are created for experts who are needed to support
 the managers and conduct additional analysis in order to ensure
 that plans are technically accurate and politically feasible. Sub-
 units within the organization participate in varying degrees during
 the planning process, depending on how much of their special-
 ized knowledge is required to create and approve the plans. Their
 interaction has to be orchestrated and coordinated with upper
 management to ensure a smooth-flowing operation for both form-
 ulation and implementation of goals. As the organization in-
 creases in size, so does the complexity of the planning process
 and the time and the resources dedicated to support it. This
 complexity, in turn, leads to greater formality as managers
 attempt to regulate their interactions.
 These imperatives of the planning process do not overload
 managers as long as the organization's environment is stable.
 With few changes in tasks, technology, stakeholders, or
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 resources, coordination by goal setting and planning works as
 anticipated, despite the additional time and resources devoted to
 them. However, as the organization's tasks and environment be-
 come more complex and uncertain, so does the need to process
 additional information for decision making and problem solving.
 Unanticipated events force managers eventually to make adapta-
 tions and coordinate changes to their well-laid plans, increasing
 the time and resources devoted to the planning process.
 Managers face a critical point when the requirements of the
 planning cycle outdistance the organization's ability to respond to
 the environment in a timely fashion. Many business managers
 found themselves on the horns of this dilemma in the 1980s. To
 be competitive they had to ensure efficient internal coordination
 at the same time they had to adapt to an increasingly complex
 and changing external environment. It was difficult to find a
 planning process that enabled them to do both. The greater the
 adaptation to the external environment, the more difficult it was
 to ensure good internal coordination.
 Consequently, warnings about the planning process began to
 appear in both the academic and practitioner press (e.g., Gray
 1986; Hurst 1986; Goold and Campbell 1990; Javidan and Dast-
 malchian 1988; Mason and Mitroff 1981; Marx 1991). Critics
 noted that planning could be dysfunctional especially if it intro-
 duced rigidity and encouraged excessive bureaucracy (Bresser
 and Bishop 1983). The formality of the planning process-the
 extent to which there are written procedures, schedules, and
 documents guiding the planning process (Al-Bazzaz and Grinyer
 1981)-risked retarding the recognition of new issues emerging
 from the environment. Formalization would set up filters for
 admissible information and potentially eliminate important extra-
 neous information from consideration in planning. Programs,
 procedures, and rules embedded in a formalized process made it
 difficult to eliminate issues once they were identified. "The
 formalized planning process crystallizes issues into defined and
 codified products and routinizes their treatment, making it diffi-
 cult to eliminate them . . ." (Dutton and Duncan 1987, 107).
 Organizational planning had some other dysfunctional
 aspects. While frequent changes of plans led to flexibility, this
 flexibility was achieved at the expense of long-term stability
 engendered and ensured by shared values and beliefs among
 organizational members (Bresser and Bishop 1983). Planning also
 tended to create short-term perspectives and adherence to rigid
 financial controls (Quinn 1980). Mintzberg and others (1986 and
 1990) further charged that rational, formalized planning actually
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 impeded action and learning. They claimed it detached thinking
 from acting, and they were concerned that it induced inflexibility
 at the very time that organizations desperately needed creative
 and inventive solutions to their complex problems and changing
 environments. The inability of researchers to conclusively link
 planning and organizational performance complicated the picture.
 Some studies found a positive relationship (Ansoff et al. 1970;
 Armstrong 1982; Bracker, Keats, and Pearson 1988; Herold
 1972; Rue and Fulmer 1973; Thune and House 1970), while
 other studies did not (Grinyer and Norburn 1975; Kallman and
 Shapiro 1978; Kudla 1980; Robinson and Pearce 1983; Sheehan
 1975). Empirical evidence in support of planning "has been
 inconsistent and often contradictory" (Pearce, Freeman, and
 Robinson 1987, 671).
 To summarize: Although organizations engaged in planning
 to coordinate their internal activities-especially when rules and
 routines and management by exception no longer sufficed-plan-
 ning could have dysfunctional consequences. These consequences
 were particularly acute when the time devoted to the planning
 cycle was greater than the time needed to respond to the external
 environment. Organizational size exacerbated these conditions
 because time allocated to the planning process increased as the
 organization's size increased. The larger the number of people
 and units, the more time and formalized procedures used to
 coordinate their activities. Thus managers in large organizations
 faced a twin challenge-to plan and to coordinate those plans yet
 at the same time to respond to their external environment. The
 question was how to keep the requirements of the planning pro-
 cess within the boundaries established by the demands of their
 environment.
 COMPENSATORY PLANNING APPROACHES IN
 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
 Over the years, businesses developed two general planning
 approaches to address this question: the modified comprehensive
 planning approach and the slack-inducing planning approach. The
 modified comprehensive planning approach relaxes the require-
 ments to integrate and plan for all elements of the organization as
 a whole. For example, the organization can create decentralized
 business units and charge them with the planning for their unique
 products or services. Alternatively, the organization can select
 just a few strategic issues to be the focus of its organization-wide
 comprehensive planning efforts. The slack-inducing planning
 approach, on the other hand, does not assume that comprehensive
 planning is desirable or possible. Instead, functional planning
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 for specialized units or incremental adaptions among units is
 recommended. Examples follow of these alternative planning
 approaches to comprehensive organizational planning.
 MODIFIED COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING STRATEGY
 One example of the modified comprehensive planning stra-
 tegy is decentralized comprehensive planning. It began in the
 1920s with the pioneering efforts of DuPont and General Motors.
 Businesses, growing and facing increasingly complex environ-
 ments, began to group their activities along product lines
 (Chandler 1962 and 1977). Separate business or product divisions
 eventually developed because top managers needed ways to re-
 duce the complexity that confronted them as they struggled to run
 multiple operations in different industries, with different technol-
 ogies and customers. Corporate executives began to delegate
 authority to the general managers of each business unit to permit
 them to operate their businesses as stand-alone profit centers.
 Centralized service staffs and personnel management from corpo-
 rate headquarters provided support while general managers could
 take advantage of local knowledge, expertise, and faster response
 time in order to meet customer and market needs. Rather than in-
 sist on integrative comprehensive planning for the entire multi-
 business operation, top-level executives now relied on new
 budget controls to maintain the link between the top and the
 decentralized units. As long as a business unit met its numbers to
 gauge performance, usually based on a few indicators such as
 profits, sales, or return on investment, there was little need to
 intervene directly in its operations. Coordination among the
 centers would be minimal as would coordination between each
 center and corporate headquarters. Integrated comprehensiveness,
 however, would be expected within the smaller business units run
 by the general managers. Reduced in size and with fewer coordi-
 nation requirements, the subunits had a greater opportunity to
 plan and still be within the response times required by their
 environments.
 Decentralized comprehensive planning continues in the
 current business climate. As John Welch, chairman of General
 Electric, recently noted in a letter to shareholders, "What we are
 trying relentlessly to do is get that small-company soul and small-
 company speed inside our big company body" (Kumar 1993).
 Computerized information systems have helped this evolution;
 businesses have eliminated layers of managers to reduce the
 reliance on middle-level management to process information and
 have improved the communication flow between business units
 and top management (Drucker 1988). More efficient processing
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 of information has expedited subunits' ability to conduct com-
 prehensive planning and decision making.
 Another variant of the modified comprehensive approach to
 planning is strategic issues planning. Strategic issues are the
 "fundamental policy questions affecting the organization" (Bryson
 1988, 56). Given their potential impact and influence on the
 organization, they have to be managed if the organization is to
 meet its objectives (Zentner 1984). Failure to address strategic
 issues can threaten the organization's effectiveness and survival
 (Ansoff 1980). Strategic issues planning is used when top man-
 agers find it more practical to manage a few major issues and
 coordinate the organization's response to those issues than to
 develop or coordinate a full-blown, comprehensive plan (King
 1982). The rest of the organization, except for those involved in
 the implementation of the strategic issues, is free to continue on
 its functional planning cycle more or less uncoupled from the
 management of the strategic issues. Coordination costs are mini-
 mized since they are limited to strategic issues.
 SLACK-INDUCING PLANNING APPROACH
 Organizations have employed the slack-inducing planning
 approach when the stringent requirements of comprehensive plan-
 ning are too costly in time and resources. Slack is the conse-
 quence of a system that operates at a satisfactory rather than an
 optimal level of performance. It is the energy that remains in a
 system because it has not been used to achieve a higher level of
 performance (March and Simon 1958; Cyert and March 1963).
 For example, if an organization is having difficulty meeting its
 delivery dates, rather than have the hierarchy deal with the
 problem on a case-by-case basis, one alternative is to increase the
 time scheduled for delivery and thus lower the likelihood of
 missing the targeted time. "Thus the creation of slack resources,
 through reduced performance levels, reduces the amount of infor-
 mation that must be processed during task execution and prevents
 the overloading of hierarchical channels" (Galbraith 1973, 15-
 16). Slack gives managers some degrees of freedom to operate.
 Rather than expect an optimal performance, they have only to
 "satisfice."
 We view the adaptive or incremental approach to decision
 making (Quinn 1980) as one example of a slack-inducing
 approach to planning. The incremental approach to planning
 requires little management energy be expended to consciously
 integrate individual decisions and goals. In fact, a plan or
 strategy is rarely written down in any one place. Instead,
 strategies and plans tend to emerge from "strategic subsystems"
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 and are "blended incrementally and opportunistically into a
 cohesive pattern" (Quinn 1991, 97). Acknowledging managers'
 cognitive limits and the organization's process limits, no formal
 planning process is expected to meet all the demands from the
 internal and external environment. Logic dictates that under these
 circumstances "one proceed flexibly and experimentally" (Quinn
 1991, 104) permitting strategies and plans to evolve as organiza-
 tional members interact, make mistakes and learn from them, test
 opportunities, and attempt to consolidate their gains. Strategies
 and plans emerge from interactions; they are not formulated in
 advance of action.
 We also consider functional or operational planning as
 another example of the slack-inducing planning approach. Func-
 tional planning is specialized planning centered on one of the
 elements of management such as marketing, research and devel-
 opment, engineering, purchasing, sales, or personnel. Because
 some functional planning can require a lengthy time frame, such
 as planning for capital expenditures that can occur on a ten- to
 twenty-year cycle, functional or operational planning sometimes
 becomes the surrogate for comprehensive planning. Businesses
 which invest heavily in R and D or have machinery requirements
 that must be determined far in advance immediately come to
 mind (Grinyer, Al-Bazzaz, and Yasai-Ardekani 1986; Kukalis
 1991). The executives in these organizations monitor techno-
 logical advances and pay particular attention to making capital
 decisions. In this instance, rather than integrate all areas of
 management, the executives concentrate on acquisitions and use
 functional planning as a substitute for overall comprehensive
 planning.
 Exhibit 1 illustrates how the planning approaches can be
 compared when measured against the dual requirements of envi-
 ronmental adaptation and internal coordination. Organizations
 that rely on informal planning have low requirements for both
 external adaptation and internal coordination. They have less
 demand for internal efficiencies and control over their operations
 (perhaps due to few competitors) and less need to coordinate unit
 activities (perhaps due to their small size or technological
 independence among the subunits). Their external environment is
 placid and places fewer demands on them to adapt. Organizations
 with a comprehensive planning approach, on the other hand, have
 higher coordination requirements (perhaps based on their greater
 size, interdependent technology, or greater need for internal
 efficiency and control). Facing an environment with a low
 requirement for adaption, however, they are able to put their
 resources on internal coordination as opposed to external
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 adaptation. Hence they can take the time to conduct comprehen-
 sive strategic planning and use it as their mechanism for internal
 coordination.
 Exhibit 1
 Contingency Model of Organizational Planning
 Organizational Coordination Requirements
 H L
 s Modified Slack-
 Comprehensive Inducing
 Planning: Planning:
 o H Decentralized Functional/
 Comprehensive; Operational;
 Strategic Issues Incremental
 ct
 0 Comprehensive Informal
 * L Planning Planning
 The slack inducing approach, either functional planning or
 incremental planning, fits an organization that faces low internal
 coordination requirements but high environmental adaptation re-
 quirements. Internal coordination and coherence is of less con-
 cern than is its need to adapt quickly to its external environment.
 On the other hand, modified comprehensive planning, either in
 the form of decentralized comprehensive planning or strategic
 issues management, serves the organization that has both high
 requirements for adaptation and coordination. Simplifying the
 coordination requirements by focusing on a few strategic issues
 or concentrating on one particular product line or service, it
 enables the organization to internally coordinate its activities and
 adapt to its volatile environment.
 PLANNING APPROACHES
 IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY
 Public bureaus face planning dilemmas that can be compared
 to those faced by businesses. Growing in size and dealing with
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 increasingly turbulent and complex environments, public bureaus
 too have been searching for alternative planning approaches to
 enable them to adapt to their external environment and to coordi-
 nate their internal operations. We will use the United States
 Navy, an organization with a long history in planning, as a case
 in point.
 Slack-Inducing Planning Approach
 The United States Navy has employed a slack-inducing plan-
 ning approach during most of the twentieth century. An excellent
 example of operational planning or functional planning comes
 from the Navy General Board constituted in 1900 (George et al.
 1985). The board was charged with developing a war plan-
 specifying what force levels and what operations and tactics of
 naval warfare would be necessary in the event of war with
 Germany and Japan. Another well-known example of operational
 planning is War Plan Orange, the plans to defeat Japan during
 World War II (Miller 1991). In fact, the Navy continues to have
 a full array of operational plans-anti-air warfare plans, anti-
 submarine warfare plans, naval aviation warfare plans, and so on
 (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 1988). Until very
 recently it has characterized its planning as bottom-up process,
 heavily reliant on the plans from the warfighting communities
 (Chief of Naval Operations 1988).
 We see evidence of functional and operational planning dur-
 ing the period between WWI and WWII when the General Board
 developed all yearly building programs and reviewed character-
 istics of new warships and auxiliaries (George et al. 1985). It
 also developed long-term shipbuilding plans during the post-
 WWII period (George et al. 1985). Budgeting activities suppor-
 tive of the PPBS cycle are another example of functional
 planning-for example, the production of the Extended Planning
 Annex (EPA) to the Navy Program Objectives Memorandum
 (POM) and the CNO Planning and Programming Guidance
 (CPPG) (George et al. 1985).
 An incremental approach to planning has characterized the
 overall planning process in the Navy and in the other services
 since WWII. Despite the unification of the services into the
 Department of Defense in 1947, the services continued to exist as
 almost autonomous entities in pursuit of their own goals and
 objectives. Until very recently, with the reorganization in the
 Navy, even subunits (air, surface, and subsurface) enjoyed a high
 degree of autonomy. It has led some to characterize DOD deci-
 sion making as "organized anarchy" (Sabrosky, Thompson, and
 481/J-PART, October 1994
This content downloaded from 205.155.65.226 on Thu, 18 May 2017 22:44:54 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Dilemma of Planning in Large-Scale Organizations
 McPherson 1983) and a 'garbage can" process (Crecine 1986;
 Bromiley 1986). Although all the services were united under the
 vision of containing communism, there was little integration and
 coordination among them in pursuit of that vision. One service
 planned for extended land war in Europe, another anticipated a
 short nuclear confrontation between the two major powers, while
 another expected a world-wide blue-water confrontation on the
 high seas. No one wanted to champion "lift," the movement of
 forces from one area to another, should that be necessary. Pro-
 curing weapons systems to match their different views on how to
 contain communism led to interoperability problems when the
 services were required to coordinate activities and fight the war
 in Vietnam. Acknowledgement of these interoperability problems
 reached their zenith in the 1980s, when the Goldwater-Nichols
 Act of 1986 forced jointness (coordination) on the services. Up to
 that time, similar to the process Quinn (1991) described in busi-
 ness, emergent strategies evolved from "strategic subsystems"
 and were "blended incrementally and opportunistically" whenever
 necessary within the Navy and within DOD as a whole. While
 the process guaranteed flexibility and experimentation, permitting
 strategies and plans to evolve as conditions changed, the costs
 were high in terms of cohesive mission accomplishment and
 resource requirements.
 Comprehensive Organizational Planning
 The ideal of comprehensive organizational planning has
 never been realized in the U.S. Navy, although there was an
 effort to introduce comprehensive organizational planning with
 the planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) in the
 1960s. Begun by the then secretary of defense, Robert
 McNamara, PPBS was to bring some order and rationality to
 decision making in DOD. The idea was to establish goals and
 strategies at the top of the organization in order to provide
 supporting departments with the guidance to make programming
 decisions. Furthermore, employing cost-benefit analysis and other
 analytical techniques to support their choices, executives were to
 ensure their plans were correlated with budgets and other organi-
 zational requirements. The Navy, along with the other major
 systems of the vast DOD complex, participated in the PPBS pro-
 cess. Within a fifteen-month cycle, it was supposed to translate
 broad national security objectives and strategies into a compre-
 hensive five-year defense plan and a yearly operating budget.
 Even though PPBS has been in a constant state of evolution
 since its inception, critics contend that it has not lived up to its
 promise. The strategic planning is ineffective or nonexistent;
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 there is a poor relationship between strategic planning and fiscal
 constraints; the absence of realistic fiscal guidance is especially
 notable; there is a failure to measure the outcomes of defense
 programs along with insufficient attention to execution and con-
 trols; and the process itself is lengthy, complex, and unstable
 (Ansoff 1984; U.S. General Accounting Office 1985; Senate
 Armed Services Committee 1985).
 The Navy's latest attempt at comprehensive organizational
 planning came in the early 1990s as an outgrowth of its commit-
 ment to Total Quality Leadership (TQL). Adopting Dr. W.E.
 Deming's approach to quality management, and taking to heart
 his first point to "create and publish to all employees a statement
 of the aims and purposes of the company" (Deming Library
 1992), the Navy recognized the importance of developing a com-
 prehensive plan for all aspects of its operations, not just those
 specific to technology development, force mix, and warfighting
 capacity. Also, given the challenge of severe budgets cuts, the
 Navy saw TQL as a vehicle for streamlining its operations for
 greater efficiency while at the same time improving the quality of
 life for its members.
 The development of a comprehensive approach to planning,
 however, required a challenge to the warfare "barons"-the three
 star admirals who were at the helm of air, surface, and sub-
 marine communities. Each had control over his community's
 funding lines, which prevented the Navy from developing a plan
 and allocating funds with the total picture in mind. In March
 1991, members of the CNO executive panel (N-OOK)2 convinced
 the vice chief of naval operations (VCNO) that senior Navy
 leadership needed to be more actively involved in organizational
 planning. He agreed that the Navy needed an integrated, compre-
 hensive planning process (referred to as strategic planning to
 distinguish it from the other types of planning in which the Navy
 was engaged), rather than reliance on functional and operational
 plans that came from the bottom up (the warfighting communi-
 ties). The ultimate aims of this process would be to articulate a
 statement of mission that was "immediately understood by the
 internal audience as well as the general public, Congress, and
 other government agencies and to provide cohesive, single-
 source, top-down guidance for planning, resource allocation, and
 future investment" (OPNAV ESC brief 1991).
 The Navy confronted many dilemmas familiar to other large
 organizations attempting to institute this top-down, integrated
 approach to planning. For example, who would "own" the com-
 prehensive planning process? Potential candidates included the
 2N-OOK advises the CNO (chief of naval
 operations) on a wide range of scientific,
 political-military, and strategic matters. It
 examines long-range Navy planning
 issues and serves as the link between the
 CNO and the CNO's executive panel of
 outside experts.
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 secretariat (the civilian side of the house) as well as Navy
 departments already involved in different aspects of operational
 and functional planning and TQL. Furthermore, who should par-
 ticipate in the process? The Navy is a very large organization.
 There are good reasons to keep the participation broad, but there
 are equally important reasons to limit group membership to facili-
 tate decision making. There was a further question of how to
 teach executives accustomed to incremental policy making to
 make decisions in the new age of discontinuity. Expert at formu-
 lating and implementing slack-inducing planning strategies, they
 were challenged to move beyond incrementalism and plan for
 transformative changes in the new world order. In what ways
 could top executives be helped to function as a team? Drawn
 from subsystems that rewarded actions to support their war-
 fighting communities rather than cross-functional cooperation,
 they were not well-practiced at working as a group for the whole.
 Well-socialized into the military culture, they were not entirely
 comfortable in violating norms and publicly disagreeing with
 authority when the time came to challenge assumptions and stan-
 dard procedures. How much outside help could be relied on in a
 planning process that, by its very nature, required a certain
 degree of secrecy and security? Another question concerned the
 viability of comprehensive organizational planning for public
 bureaus. Unfamiliar with the process utilized in business, offi-
 cials were skeptical of how it could work in the Navy and
 distrusted some of the group process "games" used to prompt
 creative, strategic thinking. How could goals be promulgated in a
 large organization-goals that were substantive and avoided
 sounding like "God and motherhood" but were not so detailed
 that they micro-managed lower-level units and preempted initia-
 tive from below. How could executives maintain strategic focus
 while they faced significant funding cuts? And how could the
 civilian and military sides of the Navy house be integrated?
 Should the secretariat plan for "things that stop at the water's
 edge," while the military focus on the "operating forces"?
 By August 1992, struggling to find satisfactory answers to
 this daunting list of questions and make the newly constituted
 comprehensive process work, top leadership began to move away
 from a comprehensive approach to organizational planning.
 Despite the enormous resources and talent dedicated to launching
 another comprehensive organizational planning effort, reality
 (organizational complexity and size and the transformative
 changes in the environment and the budget) forced the Navy to
 modify its comprehensive approach to planning.
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 MODIFIED COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING
 To this point, the Navy has attempted implementation of
 only one of the two modified approaches to comprehensive plan-
 ning-strategic issues planning. Given DOD's inability to imple-
 ment a comprehensive organizational planning process (sum-
 marized above), the Navy and the other services were unable to
 decentralize their planning processes as had business organiza-
 tions. Lacking uniform and consistent indicators of subunit
 performance, comparable to profits, sales, and return on invest-
 ment, there was no way to decentralize the Navy and the other
 services within DOD, or subunits within the services, and still
 retain control over their operations. Readiness, although tradi-
 tionally used to measure military unit performance, was difficult
 to use as a substitute because there was no consensus on what it
 meant and how it could be standardized across various military
 communities (Roberts 1992). Furthermore, readiness is a
 "throughput" variable not an output or outcome variable.
 Decentralized comprehensive planning requires universally
 agreed upon outcome measures to evaluate the effectiveness of
 subunits. Lacking uniform outcome measures, the planning pro-
 cess has no way to convert information on how well a subunit is
 executing its mission compared to other subunits. While the point
 of decentralization is to free subunits up to respond more quickly
 to their unique environments, without comparable measures of
 performance it becomes impossible for upper management to
 exert the control necessary to keep subunits aligned to overall
 organizational goals and mission. Under these circumstances,
 decentralized comprehensive planning becomes indistinguishable
 from the slack-inducing planning approach.
 It is not surprising, therefore, that the Navy is turning to
 strategic issues planning as its alternative. Top leadership, reliant
 on internal and external sources for suggestions on strategic
 issues, selects the most critical strategic issues on which the
 Navy focuses its attention. It then turns planning for each stra-
 tegic issue over to a quality management board (QMB), a cross-
 functional TQL team headed by a flag-level officer and staffed by
 Navy "owners" of that issue. The QMBs regularly brief senior
 leadership about the implementation of their action plans. Over a
 period of months in 1993, Navy leadership identified seven stra-
 tegic issues to be the focus of its organizational planning:
 information dissemination, jointness, budget, roles and missions,
 quality of life, environment (or "trees and seas"), and fleet
 support. Education and training was added as an eighth issue in
 the fall of 1993.
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 In the meantime, the resources requirements review board
 (R3B), another cross-functional team, has the responsibility for
 functional planning as part of the normal programming and
 budgeting cycle. Along with its associated investment balance
 review, a cross-functional team with sixty to seventy members, it
 is making decisions that will affect the Navy's future, such as
 how to consolidate and downsize the training and education struc-
 ture and how to manage infrastructure reductions in order to be
 on a par with the size of the force. Should the R3B surface issues
 for which a new policy is needed, the issues will be referred to
 the top leadership planning team for resolution.
 It is too soon to assess the success of strategic issues
 planning in the Navy. In its initial stages, despite the expected
 emphasis on budgeting and force planning in the downsizing
 environment, the Navy's top leadership has been devoting a great
 deal of time to strategic issues management. Additionally, the
 mechanism is in place with the QMBs to provide the linkage
 between issue planning and implementation to ensure organiza-
 tion-wide coordination of the issues. While not comprehensive
 organizational planning, strategic issues planning allows the Navy
 both to adapt to the environment and to ensure a limited degree
 of integration and coordination on a few strategic issues for the
 organization as a whole.
 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
 From a research perspective, we join with others (e.g.,
 Grinyer et al. 1986; Kukalis 1991) who challenge the assumption
 that a one-type-fits-all planning process accommodates all organi-
 zations under all conditions. We recommend taking a contingency
 approach to organizational planning and suggest that two con-
 tingencies are important to consider-organizational requirements
 for adaptation to the external environment and organizational
 requirements for internal coordination. We speculate that organi-
 zations confronting a highly volatile environment and facing
 pressures to ensure a high degree of internal coordination will
 utilize a modified comprehensive planning process. In businesses
 the process is likely to take shape as the decentralized compre-
 hensive planning approach, while in public sector organizations it
 is likely to take shape as strategic issues planning. On the other
 hand, organizations that face a less volatile external environment,
 although they have a high need for internal coordination, are
 more likely to find a comprehensive approach to organizational
 planning a better fit with their circumstances. Organizations
 confronting fewer internal coordination requirements are likely to
 elect a slack-inducing planning approach if their environment is
 486/1J-PART, October 1994
This content downloaded from 205.155.65.226 on Thu, 18 May 2017 22:44:54 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Dilemma of Planning in Large-Scale Organizations
 volatile or an informal planning approach if their environment
 places fewer demands on them.
 We also believe that the link between organization size and
 the planning process requires greater exploration. Despite the
 recommendations of some researchers that size be considered
 when designing planning systems (Lindsay and Rue 1980; Robin-
 son and Pearce 1983; Pearce, Freeman, and Robinson 1987), that
 "small firms should be considered as a separate class in . . .
 future related studies (Lindsay and Rue 1980, 402), there has
 been little research in this area. We believe that size is an
 important variable in calculating the coordination requirements of
 any organization; the larger the organization the greater the need
 for internal coordination. Thus while "small firms appear to
 enhance their effectiveness through the informal application of
 basic strategic decision-making practices" (Robinson and Pearce
 1983, 204, emphasis added), we need to clarify what planning
 processes enhance the effectiveness of larger organizations.
 Perhaps there is a life cycle of organizational planning (Lindsay
 and Rue 1980) in which organizations, as they grow, change
 their planning process to fit their environmental conditions and
 stage of development.
 A contingency approach to organizational planning would
 enable us to move beyond the stories of planning successes and
 failures and into a more serious discussion of what planning
 processes seem to work and under what conditions. Until that
 time, however, we will be contending with those who insist that
 their model and their approach is the one best way of planning.
 Our recommendations for practice follow accordingly. Al-
 though research has yet to firmly substantiate a contingency
 model of organizational planning, we believe, as we have argued
 in this article, that size does make a practical difference in the
 planning process. It is probably safer to envision a very different
 planning process for an organization of 100 than for an organiza-
 tion of 500,000. It is also time that we acknowledge the many
 organizational adaptations to the planning process that inventive
 managers have come up with over the years. Rather than dismiss
 them as just operational planning, or just functional planning, or
 just incremental planning that fail the test of comprehensive
 organizational planning, it would be wise to consider them as
 compensatory approaches enabling organizations to plan even
 though a comprehensive planning system may not be feasible or
 desirable.
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 For large public organizations, given the current state of the
 planning art, we would recommend a strategic issues approach.
 Strategic issues planning has the advantage because it singles out
 only a few critical issues on which the organization coordinates
 its activity. It enables top managers to focus on a few critical
 issues rather than require them to comprehensively integrate all
 issues into a hierarchy of goals for the entire organization. For
 public organizations that face many constraints and limitations
 (Wilson 1989; Roberts 1992), strategic issues planning can
 become a middle ground between comprehensive organizational
 planning and functional planning. It can help managers move one
 step beyond planning for lower level units and at the same time
 gain some critical experience and skills in planning for the
 strategic apex of the organization. In light of recent legislative
 attempts to require strategic planning for all U.S. federal
 bureaus, we view it as an important place to begin. It will not
 solve all questions concerning organizational planning in large
 public bureaus, but it can establish a firmer footing on which
 organizations can build and learn in the future.
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